Conflicted Owners - Intellectual Property Law and Ownership of Property

Saying something is truly yours is a rare thing these days, especially with the seemingly impossible future of house ownership in a lot of cities (especially for us here in London), and people often derive a huge sense of achievement and gratification from the fact that they've bought something and it is finally theirs to keep. Intellectual property law has rarely concerned itself with the ownership of physical things, but protects the underlying works rather than the tangible object itself, with the exception of counterfeit goods, for example. That said, there often can be confusion among the less IP-savvy of us with this distinction, but after a recent news article this misconception might not be too far off anymore. This begs the question: can intellectual property law interfere with your ownership of your things?

In a recent letter to the US Copyright office, John Deere, one of the largest manufacturers of agricultural, construction and forestry equipment, potentially put in doubt the ownership of individual's or companies in those fields over the equipment they have purchased. John Deere's comments come in the wake of an inquiry into the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, potentially allowing for the circumvention of technological measures, currently prevented under 17 USC 1201, under certain classes, for example software relating to cars or other vehicles or equipment. This exemption would allow for the breaking of software protection to aid in the diagnosis and repair of vehicles using that software, especially when it comes to non-licensed, cheaper mechanics than those licensed by John Deere, or even the modification of said software for your own purposes.

John Deere's position regarding the proposed changes is quite strong: "Circumvention of the TMPs for Class 21 will make it possible for pirates, third-party software developers, and less innovative competitors to free-ride off the creativity, unique expression and ingenuity of vehicle software designed by leading vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers". Admittedly, allowing for tinkering and free access to software does provide risks (malfunctioning of the vehicle etc.), but allowing for cheaper maintenance and possible customization potentially outweighs those issues. As for piracy, traditional copyright would still protect the software from being used by competitors or 'pirates', since the exception would only apply to repair, modification and improvements and not misappropriation or its blatant copying.

Brick was trying to find the software on his car, but couldn't

How does copyright impact, at least in John Deere's argument, ownership of your vehicle? Their argument is that "[a] vehicle owner does not acquire copyrights for software in the vehicle, and cannot properly be considered an "owner" of the vehicle software". From a plain understanding of copyright law, the argument runs true; when you purchase a piece of software, you don't 'own' the software itself per say, but garner a licence to use that software. Even with that in mind, the end-user does, and should, have rights in their use of the software, albeit not be allowed to make illegal copies of it and distribute it as they wish. John Deere acknowledge this: "...the vehicle owner receives an implied license for the life of the vehicle to operate the vehicle", which is true, at least in terms of the software. One could say it prevents the proper use of the car or its auxiliary uses (should the software fail or be irreparable due to age or lack of repair facilities), but one has to remember to distinguish ownership of the tangible from the intangible. Your car is still your car; the software isn't.

The United Kingdom does not have a similar set of broad protective measures against the circumvention of technological protection, although section 296 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 does prevent an individual from using devices to circumvent such protections (for example using 'mod-chips' to play illegal copies of video games on their consoles). Software is very much protected in the UK under copyright (more on which can be found here), and alleged misuses of vehicle software would very much be protectable against.

Copyright is a complex beast, and it does prevent one from enjoying the things you buy in the manner than some would hope to (i.e. as if they own the right to distribute the content etc.), but does not prevent you from using it in a legitimate, allowed fashion. However, do other IP rights prevent you from using your hard-earned items?

Trademarks apply to the sale of products, aiming to identify those of a certain quality or pedigree, and don't lend themselves well to the interference of ownership. Once you buy a bottle of Coca-Cola (or any brand, per your preference), the company cannot prevent you from using it to trick your siblings, or to make a mess; qualities it would possibly not enjoy associating with its brand. There has been an instance where Deadmau5, a popular electronic music producer, was told by Ferrari to remove unwarranted modifications to his Ferrari Spyder (such as changing the logo to a jumping cat one), and even though, on the face of it, it can seem like an interference with his right to use his own property, one could say the issue was probably more contractual than IP related.

Patents, similarly to trademarks, only really apply in a commercial context, and don't provide an avenue through which a patented item could be prevented from being used in a particular way. Even if your vacuum cleaner has a patented method of collecting refuse, you can still vacuum your pets without a worry or fear of interference from your vacuum brand. Any illegal copying or misuse of patented material would clearly be covered, which steps beyond the bounds of everyday use of said items.

That being said, John Deere and the other parties rallying against an exception to circumvent car software are not, as the article cited here would say, interfering with your ownership of your own items or seeking to do so. The protection of your software has been a long-standing ability within the world of IP, and their aim is not to prevent you from using your tractor that you have rightfully purchased. Whether the exception is introduced or not remains to be seen, but this writer would like to assure you your tractor is still very much yours to keep, at least for now.

Source: Wired

Retrospective - IP Addresses and Identification of Copyright Infringers

One of the more controversial aspects of the Internet is often thought of being the anonymity it offers to users. With nothing to particularly identify you as an individual, unless you provide specific information pertaining to who you are, the Internet often brings out both the good and bad in people; "Surely I can download this album or tell this person off, seeing as no one will know I did it?" There are methods of identifying someone, but as they stand today they are ineffective in pin-pointing exactly who did what, only giving an indication as to who might have been the infringer. The more predominant of those is the use of Internet Protocol addresses, or as they're more commonly known as; IP addresses.

"No Dale, you don't need to wear a balaclava on the Internet"

An IP address when put into simple terms is an indicator of a network and a device connected to that network. This is represented in a numerical fashion, such as 123.456.78.9. The numbers themselves represent the host network used and the location of that network. This information can be used to locate a person who has for example infringed copyright or done other things online which are deemed illegal. The problem with this method of identification is that it does not exactly tell us who has committed the infringement, but merely the location of the act. This essentially means that if Child A downloads music using his home Internet connection, shared by his Parents and Child B, the authorities will not be necessarily able to tell who in that household has committed that offense. This rough information can potentially be used in more questionable litigation processes, but has been used successfully in the prosecution and identification of individual in such proceedings.

"Sshh, I'm hunting infringers"

A case which dealt with the usability of IP addresses as a method of identification happened in early 2012 in the United States. K-Beech v John Does dealt with anonymous users (80 in total) who downloaded several videos of a not-so-family-friendly variety using BitTorrent technology, a work which was owned by K-Beech Ltd. In their application K-Beech alleged that the John Does had infringed their copyright by making an illegal copy of the work. These users were only identified through their IP addresses, and the court in its judgment deliberated whether it could be an accepted form of identification in such cases. Judge Brown made an interesting analogy in the matter: "An IP address provides only the location at which one of any number of computer devices may be deployed, much like a telephone number can be used for any number of telephones... it is no more likely that the subscriber to an IP address carried out a particular computer function – here the purported illegal downloading of a single pornographic film – than to say an individual who pays the telephone bill made a specific telephone call." This brings to light the point made above as to the ambiguity to who committed the given infringement in an Internet network. Judge Brown further expanded that with the ever-growing popularity of wireless connections the accuracy is fading even more, due to the even wider access to any given network by a larger number of individuals. In evidence to this the court drew on a previous judgment where it was noted that in 30% of cases the names which were given as the identified users were incorrect as to the infringing person.

What is important in the final observations of the case is the acceptance by the judiciary that an IP address can no longer effectively identify a user committing an infringement. Along with this proxy servers (a method where all network use is routed through a third-party server somewhere else, even on the other side of the globe) have even further blurred the line of actual user and who can be identified based on IP addresses alone. Judge Brown perfectly summarized this point in his conclusion relating to this point:

"In sum, although the complaints state that IP addresses are assigned to “devices” and thus by discovering the individual associated with that IP address will reveal “defendants’ true identity,” this is unlikely to be the case. Most, if not all, of the IP addresses will actually reflect a wireless router or other networking device, meaning that while the ISPs will provide the name of its subscriber, the alleged infringer could be the subscriber, a member of his or her family, an employee, invitee, neighbor or interloper."

Since the case there have been other instances where the courts have further affirmed this point and can be seen as to have closed this avenue of identification for good, at least in the US. What can be said is that this is a positive development, since the ambiguity of the true user can lead to problems for people who have absolutely nothing to do with the matter. Of course one has to emphasize individual responsibility and the need for measures to prevent such uses, but with evidentiary standards being much higher in criminal proceedings for example, it would seem odd that such an inaccurate method of identification could have been accepted.