Showing posts with label protocol. Show all posts
Showing posts with label protocol. Show all posts

17 February, 2014

Retrospective - Interpretation of Patent Claims

Patents can be, and more often than not, are incredibly complex and technical. In such complexity accuracy is paramount, especially to guarantee proper protection for the rights you wish to protect. When a patent is applied for the person or entity registering the patent has to specify the claims relating to the patent, or in other words, what the person or entity endeavors to protect with their patent. The wording used when writing claims will create the remit in which protection is awarded for that patent. As such the claims of patents are hugely important, and should things get to litigation, what the wording used protects can be equally, or even more important than what is thought it protects. How these claims are interpreted therefore needs to be expanded on, and the United Kingdom House of Lords did so in the 1980s.

A modern use of angles
The decision in question is Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd. The case concerned the production of steel lintels, which the plaintiff owned the patent for and manufactured. The lintels had a very specific rear support member, which under one of their claims was described as a "...second rigid support member extending vertically from or from near the rear edge of the first horizontal plate or part adjacent its rear edge". The defendant in question made a similar lintel, but one where the rear support member had an inclination between 6 to 8 degrees; something which deviated only that much from the plaintiff's vertical rear support member. This affected the load-bearing capabilities of the lintels, making the defendant's lintels approximately 0,6 to 1,2 percent weaker than the plaintiff's lintels. The plaintiff sued the defendant for patent infringement, ultimately ending up in the House of Lords.

Due to the slight deviation of the defendant's lintels' construction, the House of Lords had to decide whether this would still infringe the patent owned by the plaintiff. In more simple terms: whether the claim described above could be interpreted as such to include a slight deviation, or whether its express term of verticality would prevent the defendant from infringing the patent. This would have to be assessed based on the 'pith and marrow' of the claim; something which the Lords would have to consider in their judgment. What this encompasses was expressed well by Lord Diplock: "...a patent specification is a unilateral statement by the patentee, in words of his own choosing, addressed to those likely to have a practical interest in the subject matter of his invention (i.e. "skilled in the art"), by which he informs them what he claims to be the essential features of the new product or process for which the letters patent grant him a monopoly". How one would interpret claims based on their 'pith and marrow' was finally expressed by his Lordship:
"A patent specification should be given a purposive construction rather than a purely literal one derived from applying to it the kind of meticulous verbal analysis in which lawyers are too often tempted by their training to indulge. The question in each case is: whether persons with practical knowledge and experience of the kind of work in which the invention was intended to be used, would understand that strict compliance with a particular descriptive word or phrase appearing in a claim was intended by the patentee to be an essential requirement of the invention so that any variant would fall outside the monopoly claimed, even though it could have no material effect upon the way the invention worked."
This would indicate that patent claims should not purely be interpreted literally, but given a more of a purpose based assessment. Under this one could easily include slight deviations in the use of patented inventions, should the deviation still be within the purpose of the patent. A much larger change could clearly not fall under a claim, even under a purpose based assessment.

Under their Lordships' deliberation, the defendant had infringed the plaintiff's patent. Even though their construction was different, the claim was thought to have included these small variants. Clearly their Lordships intended to not limit the scope in which patent claims would be interpreted as being all too literal, and allowed for potential differences to still be included. Should strict compliance be an essential part of the patent, for more technical or functional reasons, one would have to interpret the claim more literally.

Even though the case pertained to the old Patents Act 1949, it is still accepted to apply to the current Patents Act 1977 equally. Lord Diplock's reasoning has also been utilized in several other common law countries; making the decision an important one even in today's patent litigation.

10 July, 2013

Retrospective - IP Addresses and Identification of Copyright Infringers

One of the more controversial aspects of the Internet is often thought of being the anonymity it offers to users. With nothing to particularly identify you as an individual, unless you provide specific information pertaining to who you are, the Internet often brings out both the good and bad in people; "Surely I can download this album or tell this person off, seeing as no one will know I did it?" There are methods of identifying someone, but as they stand today they are ineffective in pin-pointing exactly who did what, only giving an indication as to who might have been the infringer. The more predominant of those is the use of Internet Protocol addresses, or as they're more commonly known as; IP addresses.

"No Dale, you don't need to wear a balaclava on the Internet"
An IP address when put into simple terms is an indicator of a network and a device connected to that network. This is represented in a numerical fashion, such as 123.456.78.9. The numbers themselves represent the host network used and the location of that network. This information can be used to locate a person who has for example infringed copyright or done other things online which are deemed illegal. The problem with this method of identification is that it does not exactly tell us who has committed the infringement, but merely the location of the act. This essentially means that if Child A downloads music using his home Internet connection, shared by his Parents and Child B, the authorities will not be necessarily able to tell who in that household has committed that offense. This rough information can potentially be used in more questionable litigation processes, but has been used successfully in the prosecution and identification of individual in such proceedings.

"Sshh, I'm hunting infringers"
A case which dealt with the usability of IP addresses as a method of identification happened in early 2012 in the United States. K-Beech v John Does dealt with anonymous users (80 in total) who downloaded several videos of a not-so-family-friendly variety using BitTorrent technology, a work which was owned by K-Beech Ltd. In their application K-Beech alleged that the John Does had infringed their copyright by making an illegal copy of the work. These users were only identified through their IP addresses, and the court in its judgment deliberated whether it could be an accepted form of identification in such cases. Judge Brown made an interesting analogy in the matter: "An IP address provides only the location at which one of any number of computer devices may be deployed, much like a telephone number can be used for any number of telephones... it is no more likely that the subscriber to an IP address carried out a particular computer function – here the purported illegal downloading of a single pornographic film – than to say an individual who pays the telephone bill made a specific telephone call." This brings to light the point made above as to the ambiguity to who committed the given infringement in an Internet network. Judge Brown further expanded that with the ever-growing popularity of wireless connections the accuracy is fading even more, due to the even wider access to any given network by a larger number of individuals. In evidence to this the court drew on a previous judgment where it was noted that in 30% of cases the names which were given as the identified users were incorrect as to the infringing person.

What is important in the final observations of the case is the acceptance by the judiciary that an IP address can no longer effectively identify a user committing an infringement. Along with this proxy servers (a method where all network use is routed through a third-party server somewhere else, even on the other side of the globe) have even further blurred the line of actual user and who can be identified based on IP addresses alone. Judge Brown perfectly summarized this point in his conclusion relating to this point:
"In sum, although the complaints state that IP addresses are assigned to “devices” and thus by discovering the individual associated with that IP address will reveal “defendants’ true identity,” this is unlikely to be the case. Most, if not all, of the IP addresses will actually reflect a wireless router or other networking device, meaning that while the ISPs will provide the name of its subscriber, the alleged infringer could be the subscriber, a member of his or her family, an employee, invitee, neighbor or interloper."
Since the case there have been other instances where the courts have further affirmed this point and can be seen as to have closed this avenue of identification for good, at least in the US. What can be said is that this is a positive development, since the ambiguity of the true user can lead to problems for people who have absolutely nothing to do with the matter. Of course one has to emphasize individual responsibility and the need for measures to prevent such uses, but with evidentiary standards being much higher in criminal proceedings for example, it would seem odd that such an inaccurate method of identification could have been accepted.

04 June, 2013

IP Laws Amendment Bill 2013

A new Bill was recently introduced to the Australian Parliament, dubbed the "IP Laws Amendments Bill 2013". The aim of the Bill would be to amend current legislation pertaining to patents and plant breeder's rights, and to introduce some changes to the all-new Intellectual Property Amendments (Raising The Bar) Act 2012 (discussed on this blog some time ago).

The first amendment relates to the Crown's use of patents, further clearing up the existing provisions on the use of patents for services funded by the Federal, State or Territorial Governments of Australia. The aim of this is to reduce uncertainty as to when the power can be used. It also adds more levels of accountability over the use of patents for those purposes, forcing the Government agencies to negotiate with the patent owner prior to invoking the Crown's use on that patent - earlier legislation required absolutely no notice to the patent owner prior to use or negotiation over its use. If the negotiations are unsuccessful, Ministerial authorization can be sought to use this power. The amendments would lastly include proper guidelines as to remuneration over the use of patents by the Crown.

Australian Bills lack the pizzazz of their American cousins
The second amendment would implement the TRIPS protocol into Australian law, which would enable the issuance of compulsory licenses by the Courts for the manufacturing and exportation of patented medication to third-world countries. This would enable the importation of much cheaper drugs to countries suffering from diseases such as HIV, malaria or tuberculosis which would otherwise have very limited resources to attain these drugs.

The third amendment gives owners of Plant Breeder's Rights a course of redress against possible infringers of those rights in the Federal Circuit Court. The aim for this is to allow for a much quicker, more cost-effective and less formal way to handle these disputes when compared to taking it to the Federal Court.

The fourth amendment deals with the creation of a single trans-Tasman (Australia & New Zealand) patent attorney regime, with common qualification requirements, an IP Attorneys Board and a Disciplinary Tribunal. The amendment also creates a single patent application and examination process, lessening the amount of administration in these processes which currently exist.

The other more minor amendments deal with document retention requirements in patents, trade marks and registered designs, removing them completely from all related acts. This brings all document retention requirements under the Archives Act 1983, removing redundant copies. As said above, there are also some amendments dealing with the Raising The Bar Act 2012, fixing some oversights in its drafting.

Overall the Bill does propose some welcome changes, especially relating to the implementation of the TRIPS protocol which Australia accepted in 2007 and the faster and easier way of dealing with possible infringements of PBRs. The Bill has only passed its first reading, so its content is still subject to change over the course of its road to assent, but the given form of the Bill does inspire faith in its efficacy.

The Explanatory Memorandum for the Bill can be found here.