Humans Only - US Federal Court Rules that AI Cannot Own Copyright in Created Works

This blog has on many occasions discussed the difficult world that IP can be for both AI creations and inventions (e.g. more here, here and here), with the landscape looking more and more 'hostile' towards AI creations and inventorship. This hasn't, however, put a damper on many who will keep trying to push the envelope, and test the limits of IP laws across the world. Such an individual is the prolific inventor, Stephen Thaler, who has been on a crusade to enable AI to own many IP rights, having failed on many occasions along the way. His saga has since continued, with the US Federal Court being the next court to consider AI authorship this month.

The case of Stephen Thaler v Shira Perlmutter, Register of Copyrights an Director of the US Copyright Office concerned a system called "Creativity Machine", which Mr Thaler owns. Creativity Machine has, according to Mr Thaler, generated a piece of visual art of its own accord, which he then sought to register on the system's behalf. This application was rejected by the US Copyright Office for a lack of human authorship (see link above). Mr Thaler did not accept this outcome and appealed the decision, which landed on the desk of Judge Howell. 

Both parties sought summary judgment on the matter, for which Judge Howell handed down their judgment. At its core the matter concerned "whether a work generated entirely by an artificial system absent human involvement should be eligible for copyright".

Judge Howell first noted that, pursuant to the US Copyright Act 1976, copyright protection attaches immediately upon the creation of “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression", provided those works meet certain requirements. 

The judge also noted that "copyright law has proven malleable enough to cover works created with or involving technologies developed long after traditional media of writings memorialized on paper", which gives the Act scope to broadly adapt to changing technologies and methods of creation. 

However, despite this adaptability, at its core copyright still requires human creativity, even if that creativity is "channeled through new tools or into new media". The judge determined that "[h]uman involvement in, and ultimate creative control over, the work at issue was key to the conclusion that the new type of work fell within the bounds of copyright" (referring to the decision in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v Sarony). 

To really drive the point home, Judge Howell states that "[c]opyright has never stretched so far, however, as to protect works generated by new forms of technology operating absent any guiding human hand, as plaintiff urges here. Human authorship is a bedrock requirement of copyright". The important point here is that the decision requires that a human guides the creation of a work by AI systems, so an absence of human intervention can lead to the works falling outside of copyright protection. 

As has been mentioned in earlier decisions, this position is corroborated by the text in the Act itself, which notes that copyright attaches to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device". The fixation of the work must also be done "by or under the authority of the author". 

While the term 'author' is not defined in the Act, the judge quickly decided that the Act requires a copyrightable work to have an originator with the capacity for intellectual, creative, or artistic labour who specifically is a human. Additionally, "[t]he act of human creation—and how to best encourage human individuals to engage in that creation, and thereby promote science and the useful arts—was thus central to American copyright from its very inception".

The requirement for human authorship has also been followed and kept as copyright laws have evolved, with the Supreme Court consistently ruling that it is a crucial requirement for copyright protection (e.g. in Sarony above, Mazer v Stein and Goldstein v California). 

The courts have also consistently rejected copyright ownership by non-human authors. This has included divine beings (Urantia Found. v Kristen Maaherra), gardens (Kelley v Chicago Park District) and monkeys (Naruto v Slater). 

Judge Howell nevertheless acknowledges that in the future the courts and/or legislatures will have to grapple with "how much human input is necessary to qualify the user of an AI  system as an “author” of a generated work, the scope of the protection obtained over the resultant image, how to assess the originality of AI-generated works where the systems may have been trained on unknown pre-existing works, how copyright might best be used to incentivize creative works involving AI, and more". 

Judge Howell concluded that the US Copyright Office acted properly in denying copyright registration for a work created absent any human involvement. 

The decision is one in a long string which have denied AI authorship and inventorship, and it looks unlikely that this will change bar legislative amendments to existing copyright regimes. The current, admittedly nearly archaic legislative frameworks have not, and frankly could not have, conceived of a world where computers or AI systems could create as they do currently. This leaves legislative action as imperative, lest we want the law to forever lag behind technology. 

Keeping Their AI on the Ball - US Copyright Office Issues Guidance on the Copyright Protection of AI Generated Works

At this point there probably is no one on Earth that has not heard of, or even tested, various AI content generation systems, including ChatGPT, Google Bard and Midjourney. The tools are already impressive and are only slated to get better, so many legislatures and national bodies are (finally!) getting to grips with AI, its implications, and legal issues around the technology. One such aspect is whether AI generated works can, or will be protected by copyright, as the area remains firmly hazy as the law stands, including in the common law. One of the first off the blocks is the US Copyright Office which recently released guidance on the protection of AI generated works. 

The guidance, titled "Copyright Registration Guidance: Works Containing Material Generated by Artificial Intelligence" is brief and to the point, covering most of the issues to give better light on copyright protection on these emerging works.

The guidance initially starts with the basics, noting that for works to be protected by copyright they must have human authorship. The main decision in this regard is Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v Sarony where the US Supreme Court confirmed that  an author is “he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or literature”, which specifically can only be a human author. Subsequent decisions have confirmed the position to be the same, with precedent being clearly set in stone since 1886.

The same requirement is extended to the registration of copyright protected works by the Copyright Office, with its Compendium noting this position clearly. Any works created by AI systems are treated as the result of “mechanical reproduction” instead of an author’s “own original mental conception, to which [the author] gave visible form”, so the authorship of AI generated works will depend on the circumstances, e.g., how the AI tool operates and how it was used to create the final work. 

The Copyright Office notes that this includes simply giving the AI system a prompt and it then produces a new work, which is how most of the systems operate currently, as then the "'traditional elements of authorship' are determined and executed by the technology". What users would have to do is exercise ultimate creative control how such systems interpret any given prompts and then generate the material for them to have human authorship. 

Human authorship is possible, however, if a user "select[s] or arrange[s] AI-generated material in a sufficiently creative way that “the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship", or if an artist modifies the works created by the AI systems to meet authorship requirements. 

The guidance is a clear sign that legislation is behind the times and legal requirements for authorship would need to be updated to reflect the new paradigm of AI generation of works and their protection in some form. The protection would still have to balance the remuneration of artists whose works are used in the training data and/or source of any derivative works, while encouraging the development of these AI systems and to remunerate them accordingly. This will be a difficult balance to strike, especially since legislatures across the world are woefully behind the development of these technologies.  

Just Can't Catch a Break - US Court of Appeals Decides That AI Cannot be an Inventor of Patents

Artificial intelligence's road to recognition as a legal entity keeps hitting obstacle after obstacle, and as things stand it looks like right's in AI created works or inventions will be questionable without proper legislative intervention. Despite the continuous stumbling blocks, it seems that some inventors are very interested in continuing the fight, so yet another important decision has been reached on AI inventorship of patents in the US. The Court of Appeals recently handed down its decision on the matter, which continues on the near never-ending line of decisions across the globe that have been discussed on this blog before many times (for example here, here and here). 

The case of Stephen Thaler v Katherine Vidal concerned the DABUS AI system, which will be very familiar to the readers of this blog by now. DABUS was created by Mr Thaler and set out to create a number of inventions, and subsequently Mr Thaler applied for patents for some of these inventions (at issue specifically applications 16/524,350 and 16/524,532). In these applications Mr Thaler listed DABUS as the sole inventor. Mr Thaler also handled all of the filing formalities for DABUS, including a number of documents setting out why it is the inventor of the inventions. The USPTO rejected both applications due to them lacking a valid inventor and therefore being incomplete. The District Court, on appeal, found that "an 'inventor' under the Patent Act must be an 'individual' and the plain meaning of 'individual' as used in the statute is a natural person", and Mr Thaler therefore appealed to the Court of Appeals. 

Justice Stark noted that the sole issue in the case is whether an AI software system can be an "inventor" under the Patent Act. 

The Patent Act expressly sets out that inventors are 'individuals', which is means "the individual or, if a joint invention, the individuals collectively who invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention". The key here is the word individual, which Justice Stark highlighted to meaning "...a human being" (as decided by the Supreme Court in Mohamad v Palestinian Authority). Unless defined otherwise by statute this remains the definition, as is the case under the Patent Act. 

When not inventing, AI likes to take it easy with
a little light gardening in the evenings

Despite the wording 'whoever' being used in the Patent Act, the fact remains that these provisions are still subject to the above, i.e. that an inventor be a human being. Mr Thaler also noted that AI software programs should qualify as 'inventors' since otherwise patentability would depend on "the manner in which the invention was made". Justice Stark rejected this position, specifying that this isn't about inventorship, and also that that inventions may still be non-obvious even if they are discovered during 'routine' testing or experimentation. 

Existing precedent supports this position, with, for example, the decision in the University of Utah v Max-Planck setting out that "inventors must be natural persons and cannot be corporations or sovereigns", and in Beech Aircraft Corp v EDO Corp where it was decided that "only natural persons can be 'inventors'". Justice Stark noted that, while they deal with a different question (i.e. corporate ownership), the cases nonetheless support the position that the plain meaning of 'inventor' in the Patent Act is limited to natural persons.

Justice Stark then touched on Mr Thaler's various arguments to round out their decision. Mr Thaler had argued that inventions generated by AI should be patentable in order to encourage innovation and public disclosure. Justice Stark determined this to be purely speculative and lacking in basis under the Patent Act. Mr Thaler also argued constitutional avoidance where permitting AI programs to be inventors would support the constitutional purpose of patents "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts" and that not recognizing AI as an inventor undermines such progress, raising potential constitutional concerns that we should avoid. Justice Stark also readily rejected this position, setting out that the lack of AI inventorship would be unconstitutional, since Congress has decided to legislative limiting inventorship to human beings. 

The Court of Appeals therefore rejected Mr Thaler's appeal. 

The decision was, by no means, a surprise and continues the trajectory of rejection that AI inventorship has faced over the last several years (despite the South African CIPC registering DABUS' inventions as patents, being the only jurisdiction to do so so far). It remains to be seen whether Mr Thaler will want to try and take the matter to the Supreme Court, but it would seem unlikely to be picked up due to the sheer clarity of the matter in the US. A future involving AI inventorship would clearly require further steps from legislatures across the board, but currently there seems to be very little appetite to do so.

The EPO Are Not 'Board' of AI Yet - EPO Board of Appeal Weighs in on Whether Artificial Intelligence Can Be an Inventor

The progression of AI in the world of IP rights keeps trundling along, with many national and international bodies having already weighed in on whether AI can be an inventor for the purpose of patent law or not (discussed on this blog before). The answer seems to have been a resounding "no", however, following an earlier decision by the EPO, the EPO Board of Appeal has now issued its decision in the ever-continuing DABUS saga, which does shed some further light on the matter and does show that the current legislative framework does seem robust enough on the matter of AI (though this writer would think that specific legislative updates are still a must).

The case of Designation of inventor/DABUS (case J 0008/20) concerned two patent applications filed at the EPO (namely EP18275163 and EP18275174). The applications didn't list an inventor for the patents, but, following a clarification by the applicant, Stephen Thaler, the inventor was noted to be "DABUS". DABUS is an AI created by Mr Thaler. The EPO Receiving Section rejected both applications on the grounds that the designated inventor, DABUS, didn't meet the requirements for an inventor, that being a need for them to be a 'natural person'. Mr Thaler subsequently appealed both decisions to the Board of Appeal.

The appeal was brought on three separate grounds: (i) whether an applicant can designate an entity which is not a natural person as the inventor under Article 81 of the European Patent Convention; (ii) to comply with the EPC is it enough for an applicant to file any declaration irrespective of its content, or does the latter need to satisfy specific requirements; and (iii) whether and to what extent the EPO can examine and object to statements filed under Article 81.

To set the scene, Article 81 requires that an inventor be designated for all patent applications, and any deficient designation of an inventor can be amended under Rule 21 of the EPC. Further, Article 61 of the EPC notes that "[t]he right to a European patent shall belong to the inventor or his successor in title" (the latter being a legal successor in the title of the rights), and the rights of any employee, if they are the inventor, will be determined by the national legislation where they are employed. 

The Board of Appeal first dealt with the main request in the matter, i.e. whether an AI can be an inventor of a patent. The Board firmly rejected this point, as they determined that "[u]nder the EPC the designated inventor has to be a person with legal capacity", so adopting a simpler, ordinary meaning approach in deciding what an 'inventor' is. What the provisions around designating an inventor seek to do are to confer and protect the rights of the inventor, facilitate the enforcement of potential compensation claims provided under domestic law, and identify a legal basis for entitlement to the application. The Board clearly set out that "[d]esignating a machine without legal capacity can serve neither of these purposes". 

The Board also noted that there is no practice or agreement that would allow for the Board to overcome this specific language. The appellant also advanced an argument of fairness allowing for AI to be an inventor of a patent; however, the Board immediately rejected this argument as well. 

The Board therefore confirmed that the Receiving Section's decision was correct in raising an objection to the applications. 

In summarizing its position, the Board decided that "…the main request does not comply with the EPC, because a machine is not an inventor within the meaning of the EPC. For this reason alone it is not allowable". 

The Board then turned to the auxiliary request, i.e. whether the first sentence of Article 81 does not apply where the application does not relate to a human-made invention. The Board swiftly sided with the request and agreed that the part of Article 81 would not apply in that instance, since the provisions were drafted to confer specific rights on the inventor, so where no human inventor can be identified, then Article 81 does not apply. 

The appellant had provided a statement with this request noting that they had derived the right to the European patent as owner and creator of the machine. The Board disagreed and stated that the statement didn't bring them within the remit of Article 60, since there is no legal situation or transaction which would have made him successor in title of an inventor. 

The Board did consider two referrals that were requested to be made to the Enlarged Board, however, the referrals were rejected. 

In discussing why no referral was needed, the Board turned to matters surrounding Article 52 of the EPC, which specifies that an invention is one which is novel, industrially applicable and involves an inventive step is patentable. The appellant argued that the provision only relates to human-made inventions, and the Board agreed with this position. How a particular invention was made doesn't play a part in the patent system, so therefore it is possible that AI-generated inventions too are patentable under Article 52. However, this position can't co-exist with Article 60, so you would have inventions that are patentable under Article 52, but for which no rights are provided under Article 60. 

The Board also considered the requirement to file a statement of origin of the right to a European patent where the inventor and the applicant differ. The Board noted that this is only a formal requirement, and only informs the public of the origin of the right, but that it would be disproportionate to deny protection to patentable subject-matter for failing to fulfil such a formal requirement. 

Additionally, they noted that, as the lawmakers only had human-made inventions in mind when drafting Article 60, so it is possible that no statement on the origin of the right is required where the application concerns an invention developed by a machine. 

The crux of why Mr Thaler's applications have failed in light of the above is that there is nothing preventing him from listing himself as the inventor in relation to both applications. The Board highlighted that there is no case law "…which would prevent the user or the owner of a device involved in an inventive activity to designate himself as inventor under European patent law".

The decision is yet another among many that highlight the issues of AI inventorship and why there is simply a need for evolution in the law to accommodate AI inventions somehow. However, as noted by the Board, the creator of the AI could be listed as the inventor, bypassing this issue, however, it seems that Mr Thaler was deadset on setting a new precedent and allowing for direct ownership by the AI systems. This presents the problem of enforcement and/or remuneration, and undoubtedly these would be handled by the creator themselves, rendering this problem almost moot in this writer's view. We will see if the case progresses to the Enlarged Board, but it seems that Mr Thaler is in no way done with the DABUS saga as things stand. 

An Unusual Inventor - Australian Federal Court Gives Green Light for AI Inventors of Patents

Having spoken about whether artificial intelligence could be deemed to be an inventor was something that was discussed on this blog over a year ago, with both the UK, the US and the EU, currently, not allowing for AI to be considered as an 'inventor' and therefore any inventions created by the AI would not be patentable. While this position seems to remain in those jurisdiction, an interesting development has emerged in Australia which seems to go counter to what the above jurisdictions have decided. 

The case Thaler v Commissioner of Patents concerned a patent application for a patent by Stephen Thaler (application VID108/2021) for a patent for two inventions, created by DABUS (Mr Thaler's AI system), for an improved beverage container and a flashing beacon to be used for emergencies. The case focused on whether the AI system could be an inventor under the Patents Act 1990. The Deputy Commissioner of Patents initially rejected the application as, in their view, the application didn't comply with specific requirements and that under s. 15 of the Patents Act an AI could not be treated as an inventor. Mr Thaler then sought a judicial review of the decision, which ended up in the Federal Court.

The Court first discussed the issue generally, noting that: (i) there is no specific provision in the Patents Act that expressly refutes the proposition that an artificial intelligence system can be an inventor; (ii) there is no specific aspect of patent law, unlike copyright law involving the requirement for a human author or the existence of moral rights, that would drive a construction of the Act as excluding non-human inventors; (iii) the word "inventor" has not been expressly defined and under its ordinary meaning it can include any 'agent' which invents, including AI; (iv) the definition of an "inventor" can be seen to potentially evolve and change with the times, potentially to include non-human authors; and (v) the object of the Act is to promote the economic wellbeing of the country, which should inform the construction of the Act. 

To include AI as an inventor would, according to the Court, help in promoting innovation and the promotion of economic wellbeing in Australia. But the problem of who the ultimate legal owner of the rights still remains. This would indeed promote the objective of s. 2A of the Act, which sets out the object of the Act as discussed above. 

The Court highlighted the need for a human applicant, on behalf of the AI system, for any inventions that these systems might come up with, who would then also have the rights to any patents granted for that AI system. 

The Court also discussed the notion of the "inventive step" under s. 18 of the Act, which is a legal requirement for patentability. Both s. 18 and 7, which elaborates more on the meaning of the "inventive step", don't require an inventor per say, nor that such an inventor, if even required, would be legal person. The Court concluded that, for there to be an inventive step, a legal person isn't required as the inventor at all, even though the Act does refer to "mental acts" and "thoughts".

The Court then moved onto discussing the various dictionary definitions for what an "inventor" is. This was quickly dismissed as a grounds to limiting inventors to legal persons, as the Court noted that the definitions, as set out, have moved on from the historical meanings given to them and can't be limited in the same way. 

The next issue was who the patent would be granted to under s. 15 of the Act (but focusing on still who could be classed as an "inventor"). The section includes four different classes of person to whom a patent can be granted. 

The first is if the inventor is a person. The Court quickly determined that, as DABUS is not a person that the section won't apply in this instance, but also discussed that this does not demonstrate that the concept of a "person" would be different to that of an "inventor". An AI system could indeed be the inventor, but not able to be granted a patent as they don't fulfill the requirements of s. 15. 

The second one is a person who would, on the grant of a patent for the invention, be entitled to have the patent assigned to them. This will be discussed in more detail following the other classes. 

The third one is a person who derives title to the invention from the inventor or a person mentioned in the second class. Again, this will be discussed further in the context of the second class. 

Finally, the fourth one is a person who is the legal representative of a deceased person in one of the earlier named classes, which, unsurprisingly, the Court determined to not apply here.

Returning to the question of the second and third classes, the Court first highlighted that Mr Thaler could indeed fall under the second class as the programmer and operator of DABUS, through which he could acquire title in any inventions that may be granted patents over. The title in the patent flows through to Mr Thaler automatically, so wouldn't require the assignment of any rights by the inventor (here DABUS) to Mr Thaler. Additionally, the Court determined that s. 15 doesn't require an inventor at all, but only requires that an applicant is entitled to have a patent assigned to them. 

Also, Mr Thaler, according to the Court, would fall under the third class as he, on the face of it, he has derived title to the invention from DABUS. As the AI system cannot legally assign any inventions to Mr Thaler, however, the language of s. 15 does allow for one to derive rights in an invention even outside of legal assignment of those rights. All of Mr Thaler's rights in any invention become his by virtue of his ownership and operation of the inventor, DABUS. 

The Court succinctly summarised the matter as "generally, on a fair reading of ss. 15(1)(b) and 15(1)(c), a patent can be granted to a legal person for an invention with an artificial intelligence system or device as the inventor".

Ultimately what the case focused on is whether a valid patent application has been made, rather than who will own any patent that might be granted in the future. 

What the Court determined was that "...an inventor as recognised under the Act can be an artificial intelligence system or device. But such a non-human inventor can neither be an applicant for a patent nor a grantee of a patent". This still leaves the ownership of a patent in the air, but, focusing on what was discussed by the Court, it is more than likely that ownership in any AI inventions would automatically pass to the owner and operator of that AI system. 

The Australian Court's approach to this question has hugely departed from the viewpoints of that of the US, UK and the EU, where AI systems have been rejected as potential inventors. It will be very interesting to see the law change and evolve in this in the years to come, in particular any decisions on the granting of a patent to the owner of an AI system, but so far at least Australia seems to be on the vanguard of allowing for AI systems to potentially push the envelope on innovation and to protect those innovations in the process. 

Sine Hominum - The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Copyright

When people speak about artificial intelligence, or AI (the development of computer simulation of human behavior), they often think of things like Skynet or a near omnipotent, all-knowing computer entity that will overcome human's capabilities and rule us all through their superiority. While sci-fi can be a little heavy-handed on the drama, AI is coming and is already somewhat a part of our lives. As things develop in this field more and more legal question will have to be answered; however, this writer has been pondering its effects on copyright specifically, and what the future might hold, particularly in relation to authorship.

In the UK, under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, section 154, for a work to be protected by copyright it needs an author (discussed more here). As the law stands today this would have to be a legal person, and a computer generated piece of work, with no human input bar the basic themes or elements of the work, would have no rights in the work as an author (nor, arguably, its creator). Similar provisions exist in Canada and Australia that also require a human author.

In the United States the situation is not much different, as an author is required under 17 USC 201 (albeit is not defined further), but the US Copyright Office has raised it as a possible future problem as far back as over 50 years ago. Their considerations even back then echo the main question when it comes to copyright and AI: "...whether the "work" is basically one of human authorship, with the computer merely being an assisting instrument, or whether the traditional elements of authorship in the work …were actually conceived and executed not by man but by a machine". The US District Court did look at non-human authorship some time ago in Naruto v Slater (discussed more here and here), and maintained that non-humans cannot have authorship in works, which has been established some time in the US judiciary (specifically referring to 'humans' or 'persons'). It is quite clear therefore that AI wouldn't have authorship under US law, and no copyright would vest in the works created.

AI can make up its own mind

A possible extension of the authorship of the work, to enable to protect the work under copyright, is to view the AI (or computer executing the AI's commands) as an extension of the human author. The UK case of Express Newspapers Plc. v Liverpool Daily Post & Echo Plc discussed the creation of works with computers programs, and determined that "...[t]he computer was no more than the tool by which the...[works] were produced to the instructions, via the computer programmes, of [the author]". This was codified in section 9 of the CPDA 1988, where the provision states that "[i]n the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the author shall be taken to be the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken". While one could conceive that the AI could be seen as an extension of the human author, it still raises the question of actual input. A very sophisticated AI wouldn't, and at the heart of AI development, shouldn't require human input, bar the very basics of what is meant to be achieved through it. The AI should be able to 'think for itself' and therefore it would be a stretch to call the AI a mere tool of the human operating it initially.

The case of Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd further adds to this, where the court deemed that the authorship of the copyright protected works would be afforded to the human programmer as they "…devised the appearance of the various elements of the [video] game and the rules and logic by which each frame is generated and he wrote the relevant computer program". One should be cautious with this logic as the creation of an AI that could itself create, with minimal or no input at all, a near limitless amount of protected works, and possibly lead to a virtual monopoly in music, art or whatever the AI creates simply due to its capacity to create works on-demand (or even outside of demand). Clearly, in a broad application of creative AI in this way should be denied protection as the original programmer(s) would simply reap the benefits of their artistic 'creations' and potentially limiting the market based on the AI's capacity to create and do so nearly instantaneously. A distinction therefore needs to be made between computer-created works and works created with the assistance of computers, which would protect the interest of active, computer-assisted creators, but limit rights in passive AI creation in the absence of clear and substantial human input.

The future of copyright and AI seems quite murky, with very little legislative discussion surrounding these issues and their future. Even though changes right now might be premature, the law should be ready to follow the technology as it develops and not only be reactionary as and when needed. In being one of the few to look ahead, the EU Legal Affairs Committee has called for "...a criteria for an ‘own intellectual creation’ for copyrightable works produced by computers or robots", but left the nature of this criteria open. As technologies like Google's DeepDream, Project Magenta and Future University Hakodate's AI that writes novels, the future is almost here, and the law seems potentially unable to adjust or adapt as it stands right now.

AI presents us with a wealth of possibilities, and a way for us to revolutionize how we create, work and interact with our world, but much like the revolution presented by the Internet, AI will drastically change the landscape in which the law has to operate. While it might be possible to extend the current provisions to cover these issues, particularly relating to computer-assisted creation, specific legislation would arguably be needed to prepare, not just for what exists now, but what might exist in the coming decades.