It's Just a Part of the Process - The Disclosure of Copyright Protected Materials Is Not Communication to the Public

Any litigator will be very familiar with the process of disclosure (or discovery for our American friends), where you exchange a wealth of documents with each other as parties to litigation in order to better assess the case you have and what materials support it. Often the breadth of disclosure can be immense and encompass a huge variety of documents of all sorts, from emails, internal notes to photos, depending on the case at hand. Unsurprisingly many of these documents will be protected by copyright, and it's unclear, at least on its face, whether the sharing of those documents as a part of disclosure would infringe copyright (or could be prevented using copyright to do so). Luckily enough the CJEU was tasked to answer this question in a recent case and handed down their judgment in late October. 

The case of BY v CX concerned litigation between the parties in the Swedish civil courts, where during the disclosure process CX sent the court a seized copy of a page of text containing a photograph as evidence in the proceedings via email, which was taken from BY's website. BY requested that CX pay damages for copyright infringement for the sharing of the photographs with the court. At first instance the Swedish courts dismissed BY's claim, as, although the photographs were protected by copyright, no harm was suffered since they were shared as a part of litigation. BY subsequently appealed the decision, which ultimately ended up with the CJEU. 

The Court considered the four questions submitted to it together, which asked "...whether Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘communication to the public’, referred to in that provision, covers the transmission by electronic means to a court, as evidence in judicial proceedings between individuals, of a protected work".

To kick things off the Court went through the requirements for what amounts to a 'communication to the public', namely: (i) an act of communication of a work and (ii) the communication of that work to a public.

The Court first noted that 'an act of communication' includes any act by which a user gives access to protected works, with full knowledge of the consequences of that action, is liable to constitute an act of communication, This would be the case, prima facie, where a protected work is transmitted by electronic means to a court as evidence in judicial proceedings between individuals.

Secondly, the work has to be communicated to a 'public', which refers to an indeterminate number of potential recipients and implies, moreover, a fairly large number of persons, which does not simply mean private groups but could be the general public. 

In the current case the Court determined that the public in this instance would be a clearly defined and closed group of persons holding public service functions within a court, and not to an indeterminate number of potential recipients. The communication has not therefore been made generally, but to a specific set of professionals in the court system. In the light of this the Court saw that it would not amount to a 'communication to the public'. 

Further, even if national legislation allows for the public inspection of documents in court proceedings does not change this fact. In these instances access is granted by the courts, and not the person that sent the documents to the courts, which is often under an obligation to provide access to court documents. Article 9 specifically allows for this, as it permits the transmission of copyright protected materials for the purpose of access to public documents. 

The CJEU therefore decided that: "Article 3(1)… must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘communication to the public’, referred to in that provision, does not cover the transmission by electronic means of a protected work to a court, as evidence in judicial proceedings between individuals".

The decision is in no way surprising, since access to litigation related documents is paramount in many jurisdictions, and preventing access to them would hinder the availability of important documentation. The argument was indeed a very novel one, but one that was set to fail from the beginning. This writer wonders whether it was simply an attempt to hinder the disclosure process, but that is merely conjecture.

Locked Out - Providers of WiFi Access Not Liable for Copyright Infringement, Says CJEU

As wireless internet connections have become near ubiquitous in our daily lives amongst the cafés, libraries or businesses we visit, so has our appreciation for the facility, especially when traveling when a weary traveler might not have a connection on their smartphone. But underneath these open networks lurks the danger, and question, of possible abuse, and thus liability for those who operate the networks. This matter has been litigated in the European courts for some time now, and after an Advocate General's opinion early this year (discussed more here), many IP specialists have been waiting for the decision in McFadden; something the CJEU finally handed down late last week.

The case of Tobias Mc Fadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH dealt with the provision of an unprotected wireless network connection by Mr Mc Fadden at his business selling and leasing lighting and sound systems, which aimed to bring in business and interest for his endeavor.  In late 2010 a song was shared in his network by a third-party (the rights to which Sony Music owned), and Sony subsequently sent Mr Mc Fadden a notice to this effect. Mr Mc Fadden then took the matter to court, seeking a negative declaration of infringement, to which Sony counterclaimed infringement. The matter ultimately ended up in the CJEU, who sought to take on the matter of liability of infringement for the provider of an unprotected wireless network.

The referring court asked eight questions of the CJEU, who took each question in turn to answer the matter.

The first question dealt with whether the provision of an open WiFi connection could fall under Article 12(1) of the E-Commerce Directive, i.e. whether the service would be classed as an 'information society service'. The Court quickly saw that, even in the light of a lack of remuneration (as required by EU legislation in this instance), the service would be classed as an 'information society service' under the Directive if "...the activity is performed by the service provider in question for the purposes of advertising the goods sold or services supplied by that service provider". The provision of the service is clearly therefore equated to one producing a monetary gain, even if not charged for on the outset, possibly therefore being afforded safe harbor protection as a 'mere conduit'.

The CJEU then moved onto questions two and three, which they summarized together as asking whether Article 12(1) of the Directive only requires the provision of the aforementioned service so as to be included, or if further conditions have to be met for it to be deemed as have been provided under the Article. This would include a contractual relationship and the advertisement of the provider's services. The Court concluded that, for the service to have been provided under the provision, the access must not "...go beyond the boundaries of a technical, automatic and passive process for the transmission of the required information, there being no further conditions to be satisfied". This follows recital 43 to the tee, and clearly the mere passive provision of such a service would be deemed to have been 'provided' by virtue of doing only that.

Password required? Not interested!

The Court then answered the remaining questions in a non-sequential fashion, tackling question six first. This asks whether Article 12(1) should be interpreted as including a further condition set out in Article 14(1)(b) (on the removal of infringing content upon notification thereof). The CJEU saw that, as the Articles dealt with very different services (communication services v hosting), the condition does not apply to the provision of more transient services, but to ones that remain more permanent in the provided services (meaning, content hosted on a website stays on said website till removed, unlike in mere transient communication using a wireless connection).

This was followed by questions seven and eight, which the CJEU clumped together, summarizing them as asking whether Article 12(1) includes any further provisions in addition to the one within the Article, which are not expressly mentioned. The Court quickly dismissed this assertion, as further conditions would clearly impede the balance sought by the legislature in the introduction of the provision.

The Court then moved onto question four, which, in essence, asked whether a person (or entity) harmed through the infringement of a right could seek injunctive relief and/or possible costs for the harm caused using the above service to do so. If read in seclusion, the Article does preclude a person harmed from seeking such remedies; however, it does not expressly prevent them from doing so using national authorities to prevent the infringement from continuing. This would seem correct, as Article 12(3) expressly does not preclude national authorities from requiring such actions and/or allowing for the retrieval of costs.

Finally, questions five, nine and ten remained, which asked effectively whether the granting of an injunction such as the above is allowed (and complied with by the provider), when the provider is required to secure their connection through either a password or by monitoring the connection used. The Court emphasized the need to strike a balance between the rights afforded by the Directive and the Enforcement Directive 2004/48, especially when multiple rights are engaged in such an issue (as is the case here). The Court considered the different ways in which IP rights could be protected, and decided that "...a measure intended to secure an internet connection by means of a password must be considered to be necessary in order to ensure the effective protection of the fundamental right to protection of intellectual property". This measure would, according to the Court, protect both rights in intellectual property, as well as the freedom to conduct business through the supply on a wireless connection and the right to information in using the above. One has to, though, provide their details in order to be able to use the connection and therefore be identified if needed.

The CJEU's decision sets out a practical approach to protecting both interests, while not overly restricting the provision of wireless connections. The striking of this balance was key, and the CJEU seem to have settled on the right answer. The measures required are by no means excessive, and afford the provider plenty of protection in the event of the connection's abuse.

The United Kingdom (Finally) Updates its Copyright Exceptions

After what seems like a long year after first touching on the new recommended changes to the United Kingdom's ageing Copyright, Designs and Patents Act's exceptions, the UK government has taken its first steps to modernize its copyright scheme. Although only certain provisions will have come into force on June 1st, more specifically ones relating to research and private study, text and data-mining, education and teaching, archiving and preservation, public administration and accessible formats for disabled people, some will remain for further Parliamentary consideration. These are provisions dealing with personal copies for private use, caricature, parody and pastiche and quotation. Below I shall endeavor to expand more on the changes, and to elaborate more on the up-and-coming changes as well.

Research and Personal Study, Education, Libraries, and Archives

Although the provision for personal research and study has existed for a while, it severely limited the provision nonetheless, and merited expanding. What the now in-force Copyright and Rights in Performances (Research, Education, Libraries and Archives) Regulations 2014 does is extend the scope of the provision, allowing for the use of broadcasts, films and sound recordings to be included which were omitted prior to the Regulations' introduction. This is a sensible change as leaving out these other mediums would hinder research endeavors, especially when the copying of digital versions of such works is easier than ever.

Aaron was excited for these changes - a bit too excited

The Regulations also extend the copying capabilities of libraries and archives, while adding educational institutions and museums to copy for the sake of their educational purposes. This is important as before museums and galleries for example, would have infringed copyright in the event that they made copies of works for their displays. In addition to allowing for the copying of newer types of works, the Regulations make express provisions for their use in dedicated displays in these institutions. This clearly aims to further legitimate educational purposes without the hindrance of copyright in doing so. Libraries also are given more express liberties in the distribution and replacement of works within their collections, and allows for librarians to make copies of copyrighted works for individuals for research and study needs within certain limits.

Copying for educational purposes is furthered by the new Regulations as well by creating a new exception for "Illustration for instruction". What this new exception allows is fair dealing for the purposes of education or instruction through newer, more modern means, unlike the current exception which only allows for this when copied by hand. The Regulations also allow for the copying of broadcasts and their distribution for educational purposes, further paving way for more modern, interactive learning methods such as distance learning or e-lectures. Educational institutions are also permitted to copy and distribute copyrighted works to their students and staff, provided only a maximum of 5% of the work is copied, and if the works are distributed via electronic methods, the communication has to be secure. Overall the Regulations clearly further education in the 21st century context, and allow for more effective, robust teaching even when not at University.

Public Administration

Change are made to how public bodies can utilize and distribute copyrighted content through the Copyright (Public Administration) Regulations 2014. The Regulations enable public bodies to copy and distribute copyrighted materials for the purpose of public inspection, and for those bodies to potentially distribute such works for the purposes of dissemination, provided the works are not commercially available. According to the Intellectual Property Office these changes are meant to "...enable more public bodies to proactively share some third party copyright material online, such as material submitted by an individual or business for the purpose of maintaining a public register". This is a significant improvement, as previously these bodies could have only distributed copyrighted works in paper form physically, and not digitally.

Disability Access

Little Horace was already busy making use of the changes

Copyrighted content is made more accessible to people with disabilities, potentially preventing them from accessing or utilizing copyrighted content in their original forms. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Disability) Regulations 2014 allow for individuals to make personal copies of works in a format which would allow them to enjoy those works should their disability prevent them from doing so, such as making an electronic copy of a book if you are blind for use through screen readers. In addition to giving individuals this right the Regulations also allow for appropriate bodies to make such copies and to supply those to any person's who might need them. Clearly this significantly extends access to copyrighted content for people with disabilities, and fulfills a need which has been neglected under copyright legislation for quite some time.

Personal Copies, Parodies and Quotation

As said above, Regulations pertaining to copies made for private use, parodies and quotation are still under Parliamentary consideration. In a statement made by Intellectual Property Minister Lord Younger, the reason for the delay of these exceptions is purely because there are still "...some questions about the private copying and parody exceptions that [the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments] would like to discuss with us". This process will delay the introduction of these instruments until at least October 2014.

What the up-and-coming Copyright and Rights in Performances (Personal Copies for Private Use) Regulations 2014 will allow is for the copying of copyrighted works for personal use, provided that the person owns a copy of these works prior to making the new copies. This would include both physical and digital copies which have been bought or gifted to the owner, and excludes any borrowed or rented copies and any streams or broadcasts. This is by far the most needed exception in today's world, and would allow for individuals to make copies of works and to take them with them in a more suitable format. This could be the burning of a CD onto a physical disc for taking with you on a drive, or the ripping of a CD onto your computer and then copying it onto your MP3 player.

Finally, the Copyright and Rights in Performances (Quotation and Parody) Regulations 2014 would allow for the quoting of copyrighted content for any purpose, so long as the content being quoted is available to the public and is not quoted beyond the needs of the work in which it is quoted. This extends the ability to use such content for a wider amount of purposes, and not just for criticism, review and news report as under the current exceptions. In addition the Regulation would add a new exception for parody purposes, something which has been lacking in the UK regime for quite some time.

All-in-all the new changes to the current scheme are welcomed and needed, albeit the delay with personal copying, quotation and parody is regrettable. As the world in which we use copyrighted content has changed, so should the law, and this is its first steps into the 21st century.

Free Textbooks for All?

Anyone who's ever been in higher education, be it in law or any other subject, will vividly remember just how expensive textbooks are. This applies to both new and used ones, with some easily exceeding the 100 dollar mark. In the course of several years of education this can amount to a very large sum of money. Textbook prices have increased over 80% in the last ten years alone, while continuing to increase at a 6% annual pace. In a negative economic climate it is no surprise students are against this constant increase, and are using every avenue possible to mitigate the financial dent textbooks make. A new movement has emerged on the students' part which seems to make a questionable move to change things.

A familiar sight to most University students

The movement in question is the Textbook Liberation Project, which aims to give access to all students at the University of South Florida to textbooks for free. The project's founder, Tristan Lear, has stated that his aim is to "...take down the publishing industry and replace it with an alternative open source system". While arguably hyperbolic in its goal, the movement can be said to have the right motives, however their approach is wholly wrong from a legal perspective.

What Mr. Lear is doing is providing free PDF copies of textbooks for certain classes, while encouraging others to share their books in an equal fashion. He has also passed on flyers which contain scannable links to copies of textbooks which students can download directly onto their phones, tablets and computers. This, in Mr. Lear's mind, is purely an action against both the publishing industry and the book stores which provide legitimate copies of books both on and off-campus.

So what could Mr. Lear be liable for? Under US copyright legislation there is no particular provision which imposes secondary liability, although there are provisions which protect from it. The courts in Intellectual Reserve v Utah Lighthouse Ministry saw that the situation is not completely black and white even though there are no provisions for secondary liability: "Although the copyright statute does not expressly impose liability for contributory infringement, the absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity".

Indeed one could argue that Mr. Lear could be liable for contributory infringement through inducement, due to the fact that he is fully aware that the people he distributes the information and links to can infringe copyright, and arguably do so when presented with the option. He actively participated in his cohorts' infringement, knowing full well that they are using his methods to create infringing copies of textbooks (cases which deal with the subject matter more extensively are Sony Corporation v Universal Studios and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v Grokster). In his own words he intends to utilize mass infringement as a means to overthrow the current copyright system for another, clearly presenting a motive to compel others to infringe copyright.

The world of academia is harsh and unforgiving, both financially and intellectually. Although one can be sympathetic to the financial hardship that modern students face, having personally experienced it for the last few years myself, Mr. Lear's approach and mentality are not ones which harbor a healthy and open forum of discussion and change. Should students be able to contravene long-standing copyright laws and practices purely to save money? The answer from a legal stand-point is a simple no, but arguably there is room for improvement on part of both the publishers and institutions of higher education. Whether Mr. Lear will be taken to court remains to be seen, but should his movement start spreading into the wider United States publishers would have incentive to do so to nip the issue at the bud.

Source: TorrentFreak

Retrospective - All's Fair in Dealing and Education

Having just a few days ago written about the Canadian progression in the field of fair dealing and education in the new Copyright Modernization Act 2012, I thought it would be best to address a case that changed the way the old provisions of fair dealing applied to both study and education in newfangled ways, applying the principles set out in the mammoth of a case that was CCH, practically still hot from the oven (discussed on this blog as well and worth reading should you be unfamiliar with it).

The case of Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright) dealt with the copying of excerpts from textbooks and other materials by teachers to distribute to their students as a means to study only specific parts of texts. Some of the materials being copied were under the copyright of Access Copyright, for which various royalty payments were negotiated in the 1990s between the school boards and the company. After subsequent negotiations there was an agreement made for royalties to be paid on a volume basis, instead of the old per-student basis negotiated for most of the decade.

The use of the copies was tracked individually to ascertain the volume being copied; looking at their purpose, who made the copies, and who they were for. Most of the copying was done by teachers either for themselves or for students at their behest, which was agreed to fall under fair dealing by both parties. The contentious matter was the copying of materials for students by the teachers to take home and read. It was argued that this copying of materials did not fall under fair dealing for research or private study, as the copies were not requested by the students themselves, not meeting the requirements set out in CCH, at the initial hearing for the Copyright Board. The schools argued that they would fall under the provision thus being exempt from the tariffs set by Access Copyright. The Copyright Board decided the use did not fall under fair dealing, failing to meet the requirements under CCH; however the schools appealed the decision.

Private "study"

The case culminated in the Supreme Court of Canada in mid-2012 where the matter of whether the teachers' use fell under fair dealing, specifically the aforementioned provision of research or private study was finally decided. One has to note that the Canadian provision expressly mentions the possible use of materials for study as a private one, possibly indicating that a teacher could not act as a conveyor of material to the student, largely being Access Copyright's argument in the case; as the copies were not made at the request of students, it did not fall under fair dealing.

The courts gave an interesting argument, deciding that the teachers' use did indeed fall under fair dealing. To fully appreciate how the Court reached this conclusion, it is useful to look at what exactly was said in the judgment:

"...there is no such separate purpose on the part of the teacher.  Teachers have no ulterior motive when providing copies to students.  Nor can teachers be characterized as having the completely separate purpose of “instruction”; they are there to facilitate the students’ research and private study.  It seems to me to be axiomatic that most students lack the expertise to find or request the materials required for their own research and private study, and rely on the guidance of their teachers.  They study what they are told to study, and the teacher’s purpose in providing copies is to enable the students to have the material they need for the purpose of studying.  The teacher/copier therefore shares a symbiotic purpose with the student/user who is engaging in research or private study.  Instruction and research/private study are, in the school context, tautological."

Clearly the Court saw that the relationship between a student and their teacher is symbiotic; one where the teacher merely facilitates the students' private study by providing them with the material. Should the students be instructed to go and look for the material themselves, copy it, and use it for personal study, their learning would clearly be hindered significantly. Without the teacher being a sort of "middle-man", and being a part of that personal study, the students would suffer.

The Court didn't alter its position in the matter of personal study, firmly sticking to its prior interpretations, but did apply common sense in the relationship between a teacher and a student in that regard. The case didn't enable anyone to abuse the provision under the veil of providing materials for others for personal study. The decision was a 5-4 split decision, clearly showing a side of disdain even in the judiciary to accept this use of fair dealing as such, but nevertheless the decision seems to be a practical one and clearly makes sense. Without the option for teachers to copy and distribute reading materials for their students, the underlying matter of fairness would be skewed towards the copyright owner instead of the user, clearly going against what fair dealing stands for; the allowance of use of various copyright materials to improve yourself, your knowledge and to improve society as well without the shackles of copyright payments when clearly there is no competing interest.