Retrospective - Worldwide Injunctions on Search Results

Most of us, this writer included, take Internet search engines for granted, especially the research power they provide. Google, Yahoo and Bing offer a battery of tools to find nearly anything you'd want online, however, many of us would not be able to envision a world where their capabilities are restricted. The freedom of the Internet is one of its cornerstones, but it does cast a dark shadow through the very same freedom, for example, offering an avenue for those who wish to share, download and sell illegal materials with relative ease. In the same vein, those protecting their rights (or their online exposure, in lieu of any IP rights) undoubtedly would want to limit the capabilities offered by search engines, whether rightfully so or not. The question of injunctions over search results came to ahead in British Columbia, Canada, nearly two years ago, in a case that will be ultimately decided on by the Supreme Court of Canada in the near future.

The case of Equustek Solutions Inc. v Jack dealt with Equustek Solutions' technology that allows for industrial equipment made by two separate manufacturers to communicate with each other in a variety of ways. The defendants, Morgan Jack, Andrew Crawford, John Doe and Lee Ingraham (and their company Datalink), acted as distributors for Equustek's technology, ultimately conspiring to develop a competing piece of technology called the "GW1000", using their trade secrets attained through their role as distributors. Additionally, Equustek asserted that the competing technology used their logo and name, passing it off as the same (or similar) as the original. The use of the logo and the name (an the sale of GW1000) was conducted online by the defendants on their own website, selling the original product but switching it for their own equivalent once a sale had been concluded. Google, as a third-party, had nothing to do with the sale of the product, but they did display the infringing website as a part of their search results; however, refused to altogether block the defendants' website, voluntarily complying with only a part of the request made by Equustek. The plaintiff then sought a court order for the removal of the website from Google's search results altogether globally.

The Supreme Court of British Columbia then had to answer three questions: (i) Does this Court have territorial competence over a worldwide internet search provider such as Google?; (ii) if the answer to the first question is yes, should this Court decline to exercise jurisdiction on the basis that California is the more appropriate forum?; and (iii) Should the order sought be granted?

Roger Smith was preparing for the inevitable shut down of the Internet

The first question dealt with territorial competence, and whether the Court could rule in a worldwide capacity, especially against a US entity in Google Inc. (and its Canadian subsidiary). The starting point under Canadian law is to establish "...the existence of defined connections between the territory or legal system... and a party to the proceeding or the facts on which the proceeding is based". This, however, is assessed on a balance of probabilities based on submitted evidence, rather than a stricter evaluation of a connection. Due to the heart of the case being the misuse of intellectual property in British Columbia by Datalink, and the business therein, there would be a connection between the region and the proceedings (creating territorial competence under the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act). Going against this, Google's operation of a website accessible in British Columbia would not, in itself, be enough to establish a firm connection. In the end, Justice Fenlon saw that, in the Court's assessment, Google had a connection with the jurisdiction through its advertising activities in British Columbia, and the active provision of tailored search results therein as well.

As jurisdiction was established, the Court moved onto the question of whether British Columbia would be the appropriate forum, or whether the Court would determine California to be more appropriate, as is allowed under section 11(1) of the CJPTA.

Justice Fenlon deemed that there was no out of court relief available to Equustek, as Google's takedown system was seen as inadequate and not an appropriate remedy to protect any future infringement or sale of infringing goods by the defendants. This established a firmer need to conduct the proceedings in British Columbia, but was not the only consideration contemplated by the Court, as section 11(2) of the CJPTA imposed further factors for considerations. While Justice Fenlon dealt with the majority of the factors briefly, however, she considered the likelihood of enforcement of an order in California at more length. What this writer has to note is the potential negative ramifications of this, and the excessive reach the reach of the question of jurisdiction. Justice Fenlon saw things differently, as, in her mind: "...[the order potentially] would give every state in the world jurisdiction over Google’s search services. That may be so. But if so, it flows as a natural consequence of Google doing business on a global scale". In the end the Court deemed that Google failed to prove that California would be the more appropriate forum for the dispute, and moved onto the final question on whether the order can be granted.

The final question hinged on two aspects: whether an order can be granted against a non-party (with Google being a third-party to the dispute), and whether this order should be made against Google in a worldwide capacity.

There are certain exceptions under Canadian law that allow for the making of an order against a third-party, namely if they have knowledge of a court order and deliberately disobey it, or if that order is necessary for the aiding of fact finding or the administration of justice in any given matter.

As Google were notified by the Court of an order to take down the websites in question, the first exception potentially applied. Although not deliberately done, Google had not complied with the order before the Court of Appeal proceedings due to an administrative oversight. Justice Fenlon also confirmed that the Court could potentially grant a Mareva order (a freezing injunction) in this instance under the second exception to enforce the order against Google. Concluding the Court's position in their ability to grant this order against Google, Justice Fenlon saw that: "...the Court has authority to grant an injunction against a non-party resident in a foreign jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances. The fact that an injunction has not before been made against an internet search provider such as Google is reason to tread carefully, but does not establish that the Court does not have subject matter competence".

The last question on whether the order ultimately should be granted remained as the Court's last point of contention.

The Court considered Google's submissions on why the order should not be granted, which focused on Google's role as a passive third-party and the sheer volume of material it indexes, making it difficult or nigh impossible to police it all effectively and efficiently. Additionally the removal of the websites (or websites in general) under an order would be tantamount to censorship, and that the order sought would be way too broad.

Justice Fenlon disagreed with Google, approving the order. In her judgment, the order would not require Google to monitor its online content or activities, but to simply comply with the order to remove the websites from its services. Google also have complied with the removal of offensive or other illegal content, such as child pornography, doing so at their own behest, clearly showcasing that the removal of the websites would not be censorship or go above and beyond what the service usually does. She also distinguished the potential effect of the order from the purpose of the order itself, even if it gives worldwide effect. The impact of an order is a valid consideration, however, it does not in itself prevent or affect the Court's ability to issue one (and often, this worldwide effect is needed, as in this instance). This would have to be assessed in the light of "...a strong prima facie... or a good arguable case... to cross the threshold, and then to balance the interests of the two parties, having regard to all the relevant factors in each case, to reach a just and convenient result". As Equustek clearly suffered irreparable damage due to the inclusion of the results, and subsequent sale of the goods, the order was deemed to be equitable under the circumstances.

The Court, as said above, issued the order, with Justice Fenlon summarizing the Court's final position succinctly: "The Court must adapt to the reality of e-commerce with its potential for abuse by those who would take the property of others and sell it through the borderless electronic web of the internet. I conclude that an interim injunction should be granted compelling Google to block the defendants’ websites from Google’s search results worldwide. That order is necessary to preserve the Court’s process and to ensure that the defendants cannot continue to flout the Court’s orders".

The case is an incredibly interesting one, with the up-coming Supreme Court decision adding an extra dimension of importance to this saga. The removal of search results is clearly a big point of contention, and should the Supreme Court follow the decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Canada could become the next destination for intellectual property rights holders to better enforce their rights on the Internet. Although the decision will not necessarily change the Internet as we know it, it can have a major impact on the freedom in it (for better or worse) and this writer keenly awaits the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court.

Retrospective - Thumbnails and Inline Linking

The Internet has been the vocal point for most important developments regarding copyright since its emergence. Many cases have dealt with all manner of issues, such as ISP liability and over electronic scans of books, and there seems to be no end in sight as the law tries to adapt and mold itself to the electronic sphere. A staple feature of the world wide web is thumbnailing, where a smaller image is given to represent the real picture, often used in both search results and web pages when linking to said pictures, to make their identification and finding easier. The legality of this practice can be questioned, especially since it does, prima facie, create a copy of a work when it might not be sanctioned. However the determination of the aforementioned legal conundrum happened in the early years of the 21st century in the US Court of Appeals.

The case in question is Kelly v Arriba Soft Corporation, decided in 2002 initially, with an amended final decision being published in 2003. This concerned professional photographer Leslie Kelly, who posted some of his work on his website or others which duly licensed Mr. Kelly's works. The defendant, Arriba Soft, were the operators of an internet search engine called Ditto (which has since gone bankrupt), which displayed smaller versions of images as a part of their given search results as opposed to merely a text link to the image. Through this they amassed a database of pictures by copying the images from other websites such as Mr. Kelly's website or others which contained his works. Once Mr. Kelly found out that Arriba Soft had copied his works onto their database, he subsequently sued the corporation for copyright infringement. 

A very different thumbnail

In their judgment the Court of Appeals had to assess whether Arriba Soft's use of the images would fall under US fair use in section 107, as the reproduction of copyright protected images is only available to those who own the copyright or use the works under fair use. In their judgment the Court saw that the use of the works was both commercial and transformative, although regarding the former the use's nature was more incidental than purely for commercial gain, as Arriba Soft did not directly benefit from the displaying or selling of the images. Due to the smaller size and lower resolution of the images, their use of said images was clearly transformative from the more aesthetic nature of Mr. Kelly's work when displayed in full. As Justice Nelson stated: "The Copyright Act was intended to promote creativity, thereby benefitting the artist and the public alike... Arriba's use of Kelly's images promotes the goals... The thumbnails do not stifle artistic creativity because they are not used for illustrative or artistic purposes and therefore do not supplant the need for the originals. In addition, they benefit the public by enhancing information-gathering techniques on the internet". 

The nature of Arriba's use of Mr. Kelly's work was very different to their intended use, being more as aesthetically pleasing works of art as said above, which the thumbnails clearly were not. Even though Arriba Soft had copied the entire image into their database the Court saw that this was reasonable for their use and would not be substantially enough to merit infringement. Finally, the Court saw that Arriba Soft's use of the images did not harm Mr. Kelly's intended market, as clearly one can say that the arts market would be wholly different from that of search engines. In addition Justice Nelson stated well that: "By showing the thumbnails on its results page when users entered terms related to Kelly's images, the search engine would guide users to Kelly's web site rather than away from it". Clearly the thumbnails would only increase the potential market share of Mr. Kelly's work, directing traffic to his website all the while giving search engine users a preview of works quickly and potentially increasing their interest. As such the Court decided that Arriba Soft's use fell under fair use.

Thumbnails can be said to be very essential to modern uses of search engines, and create a great avenue from which both parties can benefit. Without them finding images would be exponentially harder. This is clearly demonstrated by the quick modification of the Court of Appeal's initial decision, which would have impeded such functions through its decision that displaying full-sized images would infringe copyright. Search engines are a complex beast, and will continually evolve, challenging the legislature and judiciary to adapt and potentially protect the free operation of the Internet and discovery of its content.